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Oded Stark * and C. Simon Fan+
Abstract
This paper synthesizes and extends recent research on “The New
Economics of the Brain Drain.” In a unified framework, the paper
shows that while recently identified adverse repercussions of the brain
drain exacerbate the long-recognized negative impact of the brain
drain, longer-term consequences turn the brain drain into the
harbinger of powerful gains. These gains have been studied already in
recent research, or merit attention in future research.
Labor migration has long been a topic of intense interest in
population research in general and in development economics in
particular. The topic has been gaining added appeal in the era of
globalization. Until recently, the received literature has taken a simple
view on the consequences of the migration of educated people from
developing countries: it results in a “brain drain” (for a systematic
review see Bhagwati and Wilson 1989). A recent and growing literature,
notably Stark, Helmenstein, and Prskawetz (1997, 1998), Mountford
(1997), and Stark and Wang (2002), argues that the brain drain is
accompanied by a beneficial brain gain. The new writings contend that
compared to a closed economy, an economy open to migration differs
not only in the opportunities workers face but also in the structure of
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the incentives that they confront: higher prospective returns to human
capital in a foreign country impinge favorably on human capital
formation decisions at home.
In a set of recent papers (Fan and Stark 2007a, 2007b, 2007c) we
synthesize and extend the two strands of the received literature, and we
analyze both the positive and negative impact of the migration of
educated workers in a unified framework. In this article we summarize
our recent research, and elaborate the further implications of our work.
1. In the short run, the negative consequences of the migration of
educated workers amount to more than a “brain drain”
We extend the received literature of “harmful brain drain” by
showing that in the short run, international migration can result in
“educated unemployment” and in overeducation, as well as in a brain
drain. Specifically, and in contrast with the literature that views the
brain drain as the only negative consequence of international migration
of educated or skilled workers, we identify three possible negative
short-run consequences.
First, consistent with the “traditional” view, migration leads to a
reduction in the “stock” of better-educated individuals, which in turn
reduces the average income in the developing country.
Second, since some educated individuals who would otherwise
have taken jobs are lured into further education only to end up
unemployed, output shrinks. Indeed, in a number of developing
countries, a large fraction of the educated workforce is unemployed.
For example, in their influential development economics textbook,
Gillis et al. (1996) allude to the Sri Lankan experience as a striking
example, noting that half of the country’s new university graduates
2

were unemployed in the 1970s. Also, Mathew (1997) reports that in
urban Kerala, India in 1983, the unemployment rate of university
graduates was 11.34 percent for males and 25.69 percent for females,
which is much higher than the unemployment rate of those who had no
education (3.52 percent for males, and 1.52 percent for females), and
the unemployment rate of those who had only primary education (6.73
percent for males, and 8.43 percent for females). More recently,
Boudarbat (2004) shows that in 2000, the unemployment rate of
university graduates in Morocco was about four times that of
individuals with less than six years of schooling.1 The phenomenon of
educated unemployment in those developing countries contrasts sharply
with the pattern of unemployment in developed countries. In the latter,
the unemployment rate and educational attainment are strongly
negatively correlated (Ashenfelter and Ham, 1979). In Fan and Stark
(2007a), we present a model of “educated unemployment.” We contend
that “educated unemployment” is caused by the prospect of
international migration, that is, by the possibility of a “brain drain.” In a
simple job-search framework we show that an individual’s reservation
wage in the labor market of the home country increases with the
probability of working abroad. Consequently, workers who fail to line
up employment abroad are less likely to immerse themselves
immediately in work in their home country. Instead, they enter
unemployment in order to engage in a repeated attempt to secure
foreign employment. Thus, we provide a new explanation for the
phenomenon of “educated unemployment” observed in developing
countries. In Fan and Stark (2007c) we add to Fan and Stark (2007a) by
re-examining the link between the prospect of migration and
unemployment in a fixed-wage framework, suggesting that the prospect
1

There is a fairly large empirical literature that consistently documents such a
phenomenon of educated unemployment in a number of developing countries. For
additional evidence that in developing countries the incidence of unemployment is higher
amongst the educated see Tenjo (1990) for Colombia, Dickens and Lang (1995) for Sri
Lanka, and Serneels (2007) for Ethiopia.
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of migration results in involuntary unemployment in the domestic labor
market. We argue that a sticky-wage model portrays accurately a setting
in which, consistent with considerable empirical and policy-related
research, a great many university graduates compete for relatively few
jobs in the public sector where the wage rate is fixed. We develop a
simple model showing that in a developing country, an increase in the
probability of working abroad induces more individuals to acquire
education, which leads to an increase in the labor supply of educated
workers in the domestic labor market. Due to a sticky wage rate, the
demand for labor is constant. We show that the increase in the
probability of working abroad results then in an increase in the
unemployment rate of educated workers in the domestic labor market.
Third, since the possibility of migration induces individuals in a
developing country to acquire higher education, when some of these
individuals end up remaining in the country, the returns to their
education could be less than its costs. From their perspective, they are
overeducated. If the country’s economy cannot “take off,” then these
individuals’ overeducation is socially inefficient (in the short run).
There is an interesting literature on “overeducation” which, in labor
economics, is defined somewhat differently than in our setting. Using
American data, Sicherman (1991) shows that overeducation can be
partly explained by the mobility patterns of educated workers. In our
setting, overeducation is explained by the migration prospect of
educated workers.
In Fan and Stark (2007b) we conduct a simulation exercise
showing that the costs of the two new negative consequences of
migration introduced in our research work, namely “educated
unemployment” and overeducation, can amount to significant losses for
the individuals affected, who may constitute a substantial proportion of
the educated individuals. However, in per capita terms, the cost of the
4

brain drain can be relatively small if the proportion of educated
individuals in the economy is small. The simulation further shows that
as the wage gap between the foreign country and the home country
widens, the average cost of educated unemployment, and that of
overeducation, will increase too.
2. A brief brush with evidence: educated unemployment and
overeducation in developing countries
The perception that educated workers are sunk into voluntary
unemployment at home, awaiting a job offer that is in line with their
expectations, has received considerable attention in the development
literature.2
In policy-related research, it is argued that the strong demand for
a higher level education and the consequent phenomenon of educated
unemployment are caused by international migration, which
significantly increases the expected returns to education relative to the
returns in a closed economy. For example, King (1987) who studies the
brain drain and educated unemployment in the Philippines observes (p.
101): “In the case of the Philippines, however, a very high demand for
college education has accompanied high rates of unemployment and
underemployment and generally low real wages. Data on immigration ...
reflect how the demand for education has been heavily influenced and
encouraged by expected rates of return from employment in overseas
labour markets. The horizons of Filipinos have expanded beyond the
domestic market because of the tremendous number of professionals
who found employment, career advancement and financial rewards
overseas. In a situation where unemployment exists and international
2

See, for example, Blaug (1970), and ILO (1971); Tenjo (1990), Zoctizoum (1980), and
Muta (1990) alluded to below; and Mathew (1997), and Boudarbat (2004) already
referred to above.
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migration is seen as a form of relief, the decline in unemployment is
only temporary, as the supply of professionals is increased by higher
expected wages. In the long run, unemployment may even be
aggravated. Government subsidy of the cost of education of emigrants,
of inexperienced workers who replace them, and of a greater number of
students wanting to enter the same profession will have to be absorbed
by the economy. Even where the cost of education is fully paid by the
individual, the demand for education increases in an occupation where
there are already unemployed resources.”
Tullao (1982) who studies the problem of unemployed nurses in
the Philippines states (p. 45): “The demand for nursing education in the
Philippines is influenced significantly by international migration. The
private profitability of investing in nursing education is greatly
increased when the probability of emigration is included in the
investment calculus. Filipinos would not demand nursing education in
the light of low wages and limited employment opportunities in the
domestic market as reflected in the low rate of return to nursing
education without migration. These unattractive domestic employment
prospects, and the cost of education are, however, overpowered by the
profitability of migration and the wage differential between foreign and
domestic market, which make the expected rates of return to nursing
education significantly higher than the returns without migration.”
Muta (1990) who seeks to understand the root causes of educated
unemployment in Asia, states (p. 23): “Migration of the educated
suggests that the demand for education has been heavily influenced and
encouraged by the expected return from employment in overseas labour
markets.”
Zoctizoum (1980) studies the problem of unemployment among
educated young people in the French-Speaking developing countries of
6

Africa, which include the Central African Republic, Cameroon, the
Ivory Coast, Benin, Gabon and Mali. Zoctizoum observes that the
phenomenon of brain drain occurs in parallel with the phenomenon of
educated unemployment. Zoctizoum writes (p. 106): “Most States are
affected by an acute shortage of university graduates and skilled
manpower, especially in technical occupations. Paradoxically, the
‘brain drain’ is increasing. African technicians, engineers and doctors
are therefore numerous in Europe. A survey carried out in France in
1968 revealed that 6.4 per cent of the total number of workers from
Africa and Madagascar living in France consisted of persons belonging
to the `higher management’ category. This proportion was nearly 60 per
cent higher than that of French `higher management’ in relation to the
active French population.”
Finally, an interesting observation is that educated unemployment
appears to have pervaded developing countries in which the official
language is English (such as the Philippines, India, and Bangladesh in
Asia (Muta)), or French (the former French colonies in Africa
(Zoctizoum)). Education acquired in these countries is relatively readily
transferable to the developed world, that is, skilled migration is viable.
Consequently, these countries have simultaneously experienced a largescale brain drain and educated unemployment.
3. Why is it that in the long run the migration of educated workers
is a blessing in disguise to developing countries?
As noted in Stark (2004, 2005), a recent growing literature on the
“brain gain” has shown that when migration is probable, the brain drain
script may have to be rewritten. For example, Stark and Wang (2002)
identified conditions under which enhanced skills result in a higher percapita output in the home country than would have been achieved if
migration were not possible. This outcome arises (partly) because
7

workers who do not end up as migrants work at home. But as they are
equipped with the skills acquired in response to their probable
migration, they are more productive.
In Fan and Stark (2007b) we add to this emerging literature by
examining a framework of a “threshold externality” of human capital,
which enables us to analyze the negative and positive impacts of
migration in different periods, and to make welfare comparisons. We
demonstrate that in the long run (“one generation down the road”), the
legacy of a relaxation in migration policy prompts “take-off” of the
economy. Drawing on studies by Azariadis and Drazen (1990) and
Galor and Stark (1994) that link the long-run growth in a country’s
output with the average level of the country’s human capital, we
emphasize the role of a “threshold externality” of human capital in
economic development. (Azariadis and Drazen (1990) and Pritchett
(1997) provide evidence in support of the assumption of a threshold
externality. Fan (2004) offers an explanation for the existence of the
threshold externality in economic development by showing that a poor
economy will engage in international trade, which will accelerate its
growth, if and only if its average level of human capital is sufficiently
high.) In a dynamic framework we show that the brain drain is
accompanied by a “brain gain;” that the ensuing “brain gain” can result
in a higher average level of human capital in the home country; that the
higher average level of human capital can prompt “take-off” of the
economy; and that the “take-off” can bite into the unemployment rate.
Thus, we depict a setting in which rather than being to blame for human
capital drain and output contraction, the migration of educated workers
is the harbinger of human capital gain and output growth. An analysis
of the entire dynamics associated with the response of educated
workers to the prospect of migration therefore raises the intriguing
possibility that what at first sight appears to constitute a curse is, in fact,
a blessing in disguise. Our results are more dramatic than those
8

reported in the received literature because in our present framework the
prospect of migration is taken to entail both depletion of human capital
and unemployment of human capital, which stacks the cards more
firmly against viewing migration as a catalyst for growth.
Our analytical predictions appear to be in line with empirical
observations. For example, from 1960 to 1980 countries characterized
by high rates of migration of skilled labor (such as India and Ireland)
were among those countries that experienced the lowest rates of
economic growth (Summers and Heston, 1991). However, since the late
1980s (that is, after approximately one generation), both India and
Ireland have experienced rapid economic growth, which to a large
extent has been due to an expansion of their skill-intensive information
technology sector.3
Specifically, our recent and ongoing research suggests that the
“brain gain” can be manifested via at least three channels.
First, overeducation can become dynamically efficient (due to the
intergenerational externality effect of human capital) even though it
may be statically inefficient. This is because children will tend to be
better educated if they have educated parents. The importance of
parental education to a child’s educational attainment has been
consistently documented since the well- known Coleman report
(Coleman et al., 1966).4 There are numerous ways in which parents’
education may affect children’s educational attainment. For example,
several educators (Sahota (1978, p.20), Van der Eyken (1977, p.70))
estimate that “about 50 percent of cognitive development of children
occurs by the age of three or four.” Bloom (1981) estimates that 80
3

See, for example, Kapur and McHale (2003) on the link between migration and the
growth of the IT sector in these countries.
4
For a helpful survey see Hanushek (1996).
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percent of an individual’s potential intelligence is developed by age 8.
Clearly, as suggested by Osberg (1984), almost all this early
conditioning environment is created by a child’s parents, and it is in
these early years that the basic personality traits of a child such as selfconfidence and aspiration, which significantly affect the child’s future
academic performance, are largely shaped. Some evidence (for example,
Vernon, 1979) suggests that the home environment also affects
children’s learning efficiency at school. In fact, the empirical literature
seems to suggest that the effect of parental education is much greater
than that of parental expenditure on children’s education. For example,
based on his exhaustive survey of the existing literature, Hanushek
(1996, p.16) concludes that “schools (i.e., expenditure on children’s
schooling) seemed relatively unimportant in determining student
achievement, while families were the key element of student success.”
Thus, parental education has a strong intergenerational (externality)
effect. This implies that while overeducation is costly to the individuals
affected in the current generation, it is a social benefit rather than a
social waste from a long term perspective.
Second, even increased “uneducated unemployment” may benefit
the long-run development of a developing country. Acemoglu and
Shimer (1999) show that individuals often do not spend enough time in
job search. They argue that moderate unemployment insurance not only
imposes risk sharing, but also increases output. By similar logic, the
possibility of working abroad makes educated individuals more “picky”
about domestic jobs. Since the educated individuals who end up at
home effectively spend more time searching for jobs in the domestic
labor market, there will be a better match between skills and jobs,
which implies that the jobs that are not suitable will be less likely to
survive. From a long-term perspective, this further improves the
industrial structures of the economy.
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Third, the prevalence of employment opportunities abroad, where
the skill mix and production technologies are vastly different from
those at origin, could tilt the type of education sought in new directions;
programming instead of engineering, biochemistry instead of law. The
possibility that workers will acquire proficiencies in fields for which
there is little current demand at home is often brought up as a criticism
of the recent work on the beneficial brain drain: workers acquire skills
that, while relevant abroad, may be of limited applicability at home.
But it is possible, indeed intriguing, to consider turning this argument
on its head. In general, the technologies in the “developed abroad” are
inherently more advanced than those in developing countries. When N
individuals acquire skills that are usable abroad, and when the
probability of migration is 0 < p < 1 , the newly acquired knowledge of
the (1 − p ) N individuals who end up staying at home could be the
catalyst for technological change at home; such a change is initiated, or
brought forward, by the presence of know-how that without the
prospect of migration would have been lacking. This argument may not
be exactly Say’s Law, which James Mill restated as “supply creates its
own demand,” but it is in the spirit of that perception.
To a large extent, the exceptional recent rate of growth of the
Indian economy (7.5 % last year) was made possible, fed, and oiled, by
the immense strides in India’s Information Technology (IT) sector, and
these strides, in turn, partly came about as a response to the lure of
rewarding IT job opportunities abroad. This aspect of the brain drain
could thus have been co-responsible for changing the course of Indian
development, for tilting the economy away from agriculture and
industry towards finance, information technology, and services. The
brain drain could thus be seen as a catalyst not only for an expansion of
the Indian economy (as in Fan and Stark, 2007b) but also its redirection
- its skipping of several rungs in the ladder of technological progress.
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As is well recognized, the phenomenal recent economic growth
in India differs fundamentally from the phenomenal recent, and no so
recent, growth in China (9.8% last year) in that China’s growth has
been a product of its efficient, all-powerful government, whereas
India’s growth has been largely unplanned. It is not a top-down affair; it
is a bottom-up spectacle. In the balance sheet of state directives /
individual initiatives, the inclinations of individuals, and the greater
scope for translating these into action, played a larger role in India’s
growth than in China’s.
India has managed to produce world-class private sector
companies: Infosys, Ranbaxy, Reliance. Infosys is a consultancy and IT
services company with 60,000 employees; Ranbaxy is a pharmaceutical
company with 10,000 employees; and Reliance is an information and
communication company with 40,000 employees. None of these
marvels, which so successfully produce for world markets, would have
attained this status but for the Indian-based supply of IT personnel. And
that supply would not exist without the prospect of employment
overseas. This possibility caused people to acquire skills for which the
local demand was then slim. Yet their initiative was not muted by
knowing that with probability (1 − p ) rewarding employment overseas
will not be obtained. When the wage premium of overseas employment
was sufficiently high, (1 − p ) was not a deterrent. At the time, human
capital investments oriented towards overseas employment could have
been considered a poor fit to the Indian needs; they were good for
“foreign” work - work in other industries in other countries. From the
point of view of the Indian economy of the time, they were a waste of
human capital. But the people who got the “wrong” training were the
precursors of the development of technologies, sectors, industries, and
companies that in themselves were, in many ways, of the “foreign
type.” They swiftly manned the ranks of the said world-oriented
companies which not only could not grow while facing bottlenecks of
12

skilled workers, but may very well have been conceived specifically to
tap into the “miseducated” unutilized, or underutilized, pool. It is not
(or not merely) that Indians who went abroad and returned home with
enhanced skills were able to start producing in India as they did abroad;
but that Indians waiting to work in fields that existed abroad but barely
at all at home acquired locally the skills that brought “abroad” home. In
a way, the failure of individuals to export themselves was conducive to
the “import” of enterprises that could gleefully make use of the freshlyformed talent.
In summary, entrepreneurs assured of an adequate supply of
workers trained to use advanced technologies could well be enticed to
introduce these technologies at home once it was clear that the local
workforce had become highly skilled. It is as if the brain drain, via the
dynamic search for a higher level of education and skills it sets in
motion, serves to loosen the grip of the traditional or obsolete
technologies. It could even be anticipated that once the new
technologies take hold, the returns to human capital within the country
will be so raised that the initial “shock” of the brain drain will be
replaced by a modified and home-based structure of incentives. In
general, technological advance in developing countries can proceed in
two ways: through gradual sequences in existing technologies, or by a
leapfrog - where new technologies are adopted while skipping over
revisions of existing technologies. Latterly, India has taken a huge leap
into a high-tech service economy. Indirectly then, the brain drain could
navigate a developing economy away from the former technological
path onto the latter technological path. And lastly (and this could well
constitute a fourth manifestation of the brain gain), when the returns to
human capital at home are rising fast, especially in the wake of the new
technologies “settling in,” it will not be all that surprising if a “reverse
brain drain” is set in motion: skilled workers will return home to
employ there the skills they have hitherto put to use abroad.
13
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